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Foreign power interference in domestic elections is an age-old, existential threat to societies.
Manifested through myriad methods from war to words, such interference is a timely example of
strategic interaction between economic and political agents. We model this interaction between
rational game players as a continuous-time differential game, constructing an analytical model of
this competition with a variety of payoff structures. Structures corresponding to all-or-nothing
attitudes regarding the effect of the interference operations by only one player lead to an arms
race in which both countries spend increasing amounts on interference and counter-interference
operations. We then confront our model with data pertaining to the Russian interference in the
2016 United States presidential election contest, introducing and estimating a Bayesian structural
time series model of election polls and social media posts by Russian Twitter troll accounts. We
show that our analytical model, while purposefully abstract and simple, adequately captures many
temporal characteristics of the election and social media activity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In democratic and nominally-democratic countries,
elections are societally and politically crucial events in
which power is allocated [1]. In fully-democratic coun-
tries elections are the method of legitimate governmental
change [2]. One country, whom we will label “Red”, may
wish to influence or appear to influence the outcome of an
election in another country, whom we will label “Blue”,
because of the importance or perceived importance of
elections in Blue with respect to Red’s interests. Such
attacks on democracies are not new; it is estimated that
the United States (U.S.) and Russia or its predecessor,
the Soviet Union, often interfere in the elections of other
nations and have consistently done this since 1946 [3].
Though academic study of this area has increased [4],
we are unaware of much formal modeling of noncooper-
ative dynamics in an election interference game. Recent
approaches to the study of this phenomena have focused
mainly on the compilation of coarse-grained (e.g., yearly
frequency) panels of election interference events and qual-
itative analysis of this data [5, 6], and data-driven studies
of the aftereffects and second-order effects of interference
operations [7, 8]. Attempts to create theoretical models
of interference operations are more sparse and include
qualitative causal models of cyberoperation influence on
voter preferences [9] and models of the underlying rea-
sons that a state may wish to interfere in the elections of
another [10].
Here, we consider a Red - Blue two-player game in which
Red wishes to influence a two-candidate, zero-sum elec-
tion taking place in Blue’s country, as outlined above. In
this context, we think of Red and Blue as the respective
foreign (Red) and domestic (Blue) intelligence services
of the two countries. Red wants a particular candidate
(candidate A) to win the election, while Blue wants the
effect of Red’s interference to be minimized. We charac-
terize this problem theoretically, deriving a noncooper-
ative, non-zero-sum differential game, and then explore
the game numerically. We find that all-or-nothing atti-
tudes by either Red or Blue can lead to arms-race con-
ditions in interference operations. In the event that one
party credibly commits to playing a particular strategy,
we derive further analytical results.
Turning to a recent instance of election interference,
we confront our model with the 2016 U.S. presidential
election in which Russia conducted interference opera-
tions [11]. After fitting a Bayesian structural time series
model to election polls and social media posts associat-
ed with Russian Internet Research Agency Twitter troll
accounts, we show that our model, though simple, is able
to adequately capture many of the observed and inferred
parameters’ dynamics. We close by proposing some the-
oretical and empirical extensions to our work.
II. THEORY
A. Election interference model
We consider the case of a simple election between two
candidates in a homogeneous environment (e.g., no insti-
tutions such as an Electoral College) so that the election
process at any time t ∈ [0, T ], a noisy representation of
which is a public poll, can be represented by a scalar
Zt ∈ [0, 1]. The model is set in continuous time here;
when we estimate parameters statistically in Sec. III we
move to a discrete-time analogue. We hypothesize that
the election dynamics take place in a latent space, where
dynamics are represented by Xt ∈ R. Without loss of
generality, we will set x < 0 to be values of the latent
poll that favor candidate A and x > 0 that favor can-
didate B. The latent and observable space are related
by Zt = φ(Xt), where φ is a sigmoidal function which
we choose to be φ(x) = 11+e−x . (This choice is arbitrary;
any sigmoidal function that is bounded between zero and
one will suffice, leading only to different parameter esti-
mates in the context of statistical estimation.) The actu-
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2al result of the election is given by φ(XT ), by which we
mean the number of votes that are earned by candidate
B is φ(XT ). The election takes place in a population
of N voting agents, each of whom updates their prefer-
ences over the candidates in the latent space at each time
step tn by a small random variable ξn,tn , each of which
satisfies En [ξn,tk ] = 0 for all t. The election process’s
increments are the sample mean of the realizations of
the voting agents’ preferences at time t. In the absence
of interference, the stochastic election model is thus very
simple—an unbiased random walk, which we write as
Xtk+1 = Xtk +
1
N
∑
1≤n≤N
ξn,tk∆t, (1)
where ∆t = tk+1 − tk. We display sample realizations of
this process for different distributions of ξn,tk in Fig. 1.
Though one distribution of ξn,tk describes the process of
hardening of political preferences and another character-
izes a system in which voting agents usually have fluctu-
ating political preferences, the sample paths of Xtk are
statistically similar since 1N
∑
n ξn,tk does not vary much
between the distributions. When N is large we can rea-
sonably approximate this process by the Wiener process,
dXt = σdWt, where σ2 ≈ Var
(
1
N
∑
1≤n≤N ξn,t
)
, which
is valid in the limit of large N . If the preference change
random variables ξn,k did not satisfy En[ξn,k] = 0, this
would not necessarily be true. For example, if {ξn,k}k≥0
were a random walk or were trend-stationary for each
n, then {En[ξn,k]}k≥0 would also respectively be a ran-
dom walk or trend-stationary and hence its sum would
not be well-described by a random walk model. A unit
root or trend-stationary ξn,k would model a population
in which political preferences were undergoing a shift in
population-wide distribution rather than just in individ-
ual preferences. However, even if En[ξn,k] 6= 0 for each
n, it is also not necessarily the case that a version of the
random walk model is not a valid approximation for the
electoral process. If the stochastic evolution equation for
En[ξn,k] has as its solution a stationary colored noise with
exponentially-decaying covariance function, then the sum
(integral) of this noise will satisfy a Stratonovich-type
equation [12–14] that may be a suitably generalized (in
terms of the covariance structure) version of the basic
random walk model considered here.
We denote the control policies of Red and Blue— the
functions by which Red and Blue attempt to influence
(or prevent influence on) the election—by uR(t) and
uB(t). These functions are one-dimensional continuous-
time stochastic processes (time series); the term “policy”
originates from the fields of economics and reinforcment
learning. These control policies are abstract variables in
the context of our model but can be interpreted as mon-
etary expenditures on interference operations. We will
assume that Red and Blue can affect the mean trajec-
tory of the election but not its volatility (variance of its
increments). We make this assumption because Xt is an
approximation to the process described by Eq. 1 and, as
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FIG. 1. Though simple, the random walk latent space
election model is an approximation to varied population
candidate preference updates. The latent election process
evolves according to Xk+1 = Xk +
1
N
∑
1≤n≤N ξn,k, where
ξn,k is voting agent n’s shift toward the left (< 0) or right
(> 0) of the political spectrum at time k. In the cen-
ter panel, the solid curve is a draw from the latent elec-
tion process resulting from the preference updates ξn,t ∼
B
(
0.1T−t
T
+ 1.5 t
T
, 0.1T−t
T
+ 1.5 t
T
)
, where B(α, β) is the Beta
distribution and we have set T = 365. This change in
political preference shift distribution describes an electorate
with increasing resistance to change in their political view-
points. We display the preference shift distributions at t = 0
(t = T ) in Panel A (Panel B). For contrast, the dashed
curve is a draw from the latent election process resulting from
ξn,t ∼ B
(
1.5T−k
T
+ 0.1 k
T
, 1.5T−k
T
+ 0.1 k
T
)
, which describes
an electorate in which the component agents often have chang-
ing political preferences. We show the corresponding prefer-
ence shift distributions at t = 0 (t = T ) in Panel D (Panel
E). Despite these preference updates that are, in some sense,
opposites of each other, the latent processes Xt are statistical-
ly very similar and are both well-modeled by the continuum
approximation dXt = σdWt.
displayed in Fig. 1 and described above, this process’s
statistical characteristics do not change much even when
the voting population’s underlying preference change dis-
tributions are significantly different. Thus, under the
influence of Red’s and Blue’s control policies, the elec-
tion dynamics become
dXt = f(uR(t), uB(t))dt+ σdWt, X0 = y. (2)
To first order expansion we have f(uR(t), uB(t)) = a0 +
aRuR(t) + aBuB(t) +O(u2) which is most accurate near
u = 0, so we approximate the state equation by
dXt = [uR(t) + uB(t)]dt+ σdWt, X0 = y, (3)
3since we have assumed a priori zero drift and can absorb
constants into the definition of the control policies. We
will use Eq. 3 as the state equation for the remainder of
the paper.
B. Subgame-perfect Nash equilibria
Red and Blue each seek to minimize separate scalar
cost functionals of their own control policy and the other
agent’s control policy; for now, we will assume that the
agents do not incur a running cost from the value of the
state variable. The cost functionals can thus be written
EuR,uB,X
{
ΦR(XT ) +
∫ T
0
CR(uR(t), uB(t)) dt
}
, (4)
and
EuR,uB,X
{
ΦB(XT ) +
∫ T
0
CB(uR(t), uB(t)) dt
}
. (5)
The functions CR and CB represent the running cost
or benefit of conducting election interference operations.
We assume the cost functions have the form
Ci(uR, uB) = u
2
i − λiu2¬i (6)
for i ∈ {R,B}. (The notation ¬i indicates the other
player—for example, if i = R, ¬i = B—and originates
in the study of noncooperative economic games.) The
non-negative scalar λi parameterizes the utility gained
by player i from observing player ¬i’s effort; if λi is
high, player i gains utility from player ¬i’s expending
resources, while if λi = 0, player i has no regard for
¬i’s level of effort but only for their own running cost
and the final cost. The assumption of quadratic control
is common in optimal control theory as it can be justi-
fied as a Taylor approximation to an arbitrary even cost
function. If we write an arbitrary analytic cost function
for player i as Ci(uR, uB) = C(i)(ui) − λiC(¬i)(u¬i) and
make the assumptions that it is equally costly to conduct
operations that favor candidate A or candidate B (hence
imposing that C(i) and C(¬i) are even) and that player
i conducting no interference operations results in player
i’s incurring no direct cost from this choice, then the first
non-zero term in the Taylor expansion of Ci is given by
Eq. 6.
Though the running cost functions are equivalent across
players in form, the final conditions differ between Red
and Blue because of their qualitatively distinct objec-
tives. Since Red wants to influence the outcome of
the election in Blue’s country in favor of candidate A,
their final cost function ΦR must satisfy ΦR(x) < ΦR(y)
for all x < 0 and y > 0; in our example final condi-
tions presented here we also assume that ΦR is mono-
tonically non-decreasing everywhere, but we relax this
assumption in Sec. III in which we confront this mod-
el with election interference-related data; to the extent
that this model describes reality, it is probably not true
that these restrictive assumptions on the final condition
are always satisfied by all Red teams conducting elec-
tion interference operations. One possible final condition
that satisfies these requirements is ΦR(x) = c0+c1x, but
this allows the somewhat unrealistic limiting condition
of infinite benefit (cost) if candidate A gets 100% (0%)
of the vote in the election. We will thus also consid-
er two Red final conditions with bounded extremal cost:
one smooth, ΦR(x) = tanh(x); and one discontinuous,
ΦR(x) = Θ(x)−Θ(−x). By Θ(·) we mean the Heaviside
step function.
Blue is attempting to ameliorate the effects of Red’s con-
trol policy—reduce the overall impact of Red’s interfer-
ence operations on the electoral process—hence the form
of the state dynamics presented in Eq. 3. Since Blue is a
priori indifferent between the outcomes of the election, at
first glance it appears that the final condition ΦB(x) = 0
is a reasonable modeling choice. However, for the case
λB = 0, this results in Blue taking no action at all in
the game due to the functional form of Eq. 6. In other
words, if Blue does not gain utility from Red expending
resources, then Blue will not try to stop red from inter-
fering in an election in Blue’s country! Hence it appears
likely that Blue must actually have nontrivial preferences
over the election outcome.
We present three possible alternatives for a cost function
representing Blue’s preferences; as in the case of Red’s
final condition, this list is entirely non-exhaustive. Blue
may simply be suspicious that a result was due to Red’s
interference if XT is too far from E0[XT ] = 0. An exam-
ple of a smooth function that represents these preferences
over the election outcome is ΦB(x) =
1
2x
2. However,
this neglects the reality that Red’s objective is not to
have either candidate A or candidate B win by a large
margin, but rather to have candidate A win (i.e., have
XT < 0). Thus Blue might be unconcerned about larg-
er positive values of the state variable and, modifying
the previous function suitably, have ΦB(x) =
1
2x
2Θ(−x).
Alternatively, Blue may accept the result of the elec-
tion as long as it does not stray “too far” from the
initial expected value. An example of a discontinuous
final condition that can represent these preferences is
ΦB(x) = Θ(|x| > ∆) − Θ(|x| ≤ ∆), where ∆ > 0 is
Blue’s accepted margin of error.
A nondenumerable panolopy of other final conditions can
be hypothesized, but the example functions that we have
presented here give some qualitative sense of the range
of possible payoff structures. We include:
• “First-order” functions that could result from the
Taylor expansion about zero of an arbitrary analyt-
ic final condition—linear, in the case of Red’s anti-
symmetric final condition, and quadratic in the case
of Blue’s smooth symmetric final condition (which
is the first non-constant term in the Taylor expan-
sion of an even analytic function);
4• Smooth functions that represent preferences over
the result of the electoral process that we deem
marginally more realistic, such as bounded benefit
/ cost and the recognition that Red (by assump-
tion) favors one candidate in particular; and
• Discontinuous final conditions that model “all-or-
nothing” preferences over the outcome (either can-
didate A wins or they do not; either Red interferes
less than a certain amount or they interfere more).
These functions do not capture some interesting behav-
ior that might exist in real election interference oper-
ations. For example, Red’s preferences concerning the
result of the election outccome might be as follows: “we
would prefer that candidate A wins the election, but if
they cannot, then we would like candidate B to win by
a landslide so that we can claim the electoral system in
Blue’s country was rigged against candidate A”. These
preferences correspond to a final condition with a global
minimum at some x < 0 but a secondary local minimum
at x 0; this situation is clearly not modeled by any of
the final conditions given above. In Sec. III we will drop
the assumption that the final conditions are parameter-
ized according to any of the functional forms considered
in thise section and instead infer them from observed
election and election interference proxy data.
The application of the dynamic programming principle
[15, 16] to Eqs. 3, 4, and 5 leads to a system of coupled
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations for the value func-
tions of Red and Blue,
−∂VR
∂t
= min
uR
{
∂VR
∂x
[uR + uB] + u
2
R − λRu2B +
σ2
2
∂2VR
∂x2
}
,
(7)
and
−∂VB
∂t
= min
uB
{
∂VB
∂x
[uR + uB] + u
2
B − λBu2R +
σ2
2
∂2VB
∂x2
}
.
(8)
The dynamic programming principle does not result in
an Isaacs equation because the game is not zero-sum and
the cost functionals for Red and Blue can have differ-
ent functional forms. (The Isaacs equation is a nonlinear
elliptic or parabolic equation that arises in the study of
two-player, zero-sum games in which one player attempts
to maximize a functional and the other player attempts
to minimize it [17, 18].) Performing the minimization
with respect to the control variables gives the Nash equi-
librium control policies,
uR(t) = −1
2
∂VR
∂x
∣∣∣∣
(t,Xt)
(9)
uB(t) = −1
2
∂VB
∂x
∣∣∣∣
(t,Xt)
, (10)
and the exact functional form of Eqs. 7 and 8,
−∂VR
∂t
= −1
4
(
∂VR
∂x
)2
− 1
2
∂VR
∂x
∂VB
∂x
− λR
4
(
∂VB
∂x
)2
+
σ2
2
∂2VR
∂x2
, VR(x, T ) = ΦR(x); (11)
−∂VB
∂t
= −1
4
(
∂VB
∂x
)2
− 1
2
∂VB
∂x
∂VR
∂x
− λB
4
(
∂VR
∂x
)2
+
σ2
2
∂2VB
∂x2
, VB(x, T ) = ΦB(x). (12)
When solved over the entirety of state space, solu-
tions to Eqs. 11 and 12 constitute the strategies of a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium because, no matter
the action taken by player ¬i at time t, player i is
able to respond with the optimal action at time t + dt.
Given the solution pair VR(x, t) and VB(x, t), the dis-
tribution of Z = (x, uR, uB)
T can be written analyti-
cally. Substitution of Eqs. 9 and 10 into Eq. 3 gives
dx = − 12
{
∂VR
∂x |(t,x) + ∂VB∂x |(t,x)
}
dt+σdW. We discretize
the state equation to obtain
xn+1 − xn + ∆t
2
[V ′Rn + V
′
Bn]
− (∆t)1/2σwn − yδn,0 = 0,
(13)
with wn ∼ N (0, 1) and where we have put V ′in ≡
V ′i (xn, tn). Thus the distribution of an increment of the
latent electoral process is
p(xn+1|xn) = 1√
2piσ2∆t
e−
∆t
2σ2
(
xn+1−xn
∆t +
1
2 [V
′
Rn+V
′
Bn]−y δn0∆t )2 .
(14)
Now, using the Markov property of Xt, we have
p(x1, ..., xN |x0) =
N−1∏
n=0
p(xn+1|xn) (15)
=
1
(2piσ2∆t)N/2
exp {−S(x1, ..., xN )} ,
(16)
where
S(x1, ..., xN ) =
1
2σ2
N−1∑
n=0
∆t
[xn+1 − xn
∆t
+
1
2
[V ′Rn + V
′
Bn]−
yδn,0
∆t
]2
.
(17)
5Taking N → ∞ as N∆t = T remains constant gives a
standard Gaussian path integral with an action S(x(t))
that incorporates the derivatives of the value functions.
Since uR and uB are just time-dependent functions of
x(t), their distributions can also be found explicitly using
the probability distribution Eq. 16 and the appropri-
ate (time-dependent) Jacobian transformation. Unfor-
tunately, these analytical results are of limited utility
because we are unaware of analytical solutions to the
system given in Eqs. 11 and 12, and hence V ′R(x, t) and
V ′B(x, t) must be approximated. However, we will have
something to say about analytical solutions presently in
the case that player i announces a credible commitment
to a particular control path.
In the general case presented above, we find the value
functions VR(x, t) and VB(x, t) numerically through back-
ward iteration, enforcing a Neumann boundary condition
at x = ±3, which corresponds to bounding polling popu-
larity of candidate B from below by 4.7% and from above
by 95.3% [19]. Fig. 2 displays example realizations of the
value functions for different λi and final conditions. The
value functions display diffusive behavior in common due
to the game’s stochasticity, but also differ qualitatively
depending on the effect of the final condition propagat-
ing backward in time. When the final conditions are
discontinuous, as is the case in the top panels of Fig.
2, the derivatives of the value function assume greater
magnitudes and vary more rapidly throughout the game
than do the derivatives of the value function when the
final conditions are continuous; this is a typical feature
of solutions to equations of HJB-type [20] and has con-
sequences for the game-theoretic interpretation of these
results, as we discuss below. Fig. 2 also demonstrates
that the extrema of the value functions are not as large in
magnitude when λR = λB = 0 as when λR = λB = 2; this
is because higher values of λi mean that player i derives
utility not only from the final outcome of the game but
also from causing player ¬i to expend resources in the
game.
Eqs. 7 and 8 give the closed-loop control policies uR and
uB respectively given the current state Xt and time t. We
display samples of uR, uB, and the electoral process Zt in
Fig. 3 to illuminate some of the qualitative properties of
this game before considering a more comprehensive sweep
over parameters. We simulate the game with parameters
λR = λB = 2, ΦR(x) = x, and ΦB(x) =
1
2x
2Θ(−x).
We plot the control policies in the top panel including
the mean control policies E[uR] and E[uB], displayed in
thicker curves. For this parameter set, it is optimal for
Red to begin play with a relatively large amount of inter-
ference and, in the mean, decrease the level of interfer-
ence over time. Conversely, throughout the game Blue
increases their resistance to Red’s interference. Despite
this resistance, the bottom panel reveals that, for this
parameter set, Red is able to accomplish their objective
of causing candidate A to win: in the mean case, candi-
date A enjoys a comfortable lead in the election poll by
the final time.
To gain a better idea of the qualitative nature of this
game for a more varied set of parameters, we conducted
a coarse parameter sweep over λR, λB, ΦR, and ΦB.
Figs. 4 and 5 displays the results of this parameter
sweep for two combinations of final conditions; hold-
ing Blue’s final condition of ΦB(x) =
1
2x
2Θ(−x)
constant, we compare the means and standard
deviations of the Nash equilibrium strategies uR(t)
and uB(t) across values of the coupling parameters
λR, λB ∈ [0, 3] as Red’s final condition changes from
ΦR(x) = tanh(x) to ΦR(x) = Θ(x) − Θ(−x). For
these combinations of final conditions, higher values
of the coupling parameters λi cause greater fluctua-
tion in control policies. This increase in fluctuation
is more pronounced when Red’s final condition is
discontinuous, which is sensible since in this case
limt→T− uR(x, t) = − 12δ(x). Appendix A contains simi-
lar figures for each 32 = 9 combinations of Red example
final conditions, ΦR(x) ∈ {tanh(x),Θ(x)−Θ(−x), x}
and Blue example final conditions, ΦB(x) ∈{
1
xx
2, 12x
2Θ(−x),Θ(|x| > ∆)−Θ(|x| < ∆)}. We
also find that certain combinations of parameters lead
to an “arms-race” effect in both players’ control policies;
for these parameter combinations, Nash equilibrium
strategies entail superexponential growth in the mag-
nitude of each player’s control policy near the end of
the game. Figure 6 displays E[uR] and E[uB] for these
parameter combinations, along with the middle 80
percentiles (10th to 90th percentile) of uR(t) and uB(t)
for each t. This precipitous growth in the magnitude
of the control policies occurs when either player has a
discontinuous final condition. Although a discontinuous
final condition by player i leads to a greater increase
in the mean magnitude in player i’s control policy
than in player ¬i’s, the distribution of each player’s
policy exhibits a similar superexponential growth in
dispersion (and hence in magnitude). To the extent
that this model reflects reality, this points to a general
statement about election interference operations: An
all-or-nothing mindset by either Red or Blue regarding
the final outcome of the election leads to an arms race
that negatively affects both players. This is a general
feature of any situation to which the model described by
Eqs. 3 – 5 applies.
C. Credible commitment
If player ¬i credibly commits to playing a particular
strategy v(t) on all of [0, T ], then the difficult problem
of player i’s finding a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
strategy profile becomes a slightly easier problem of opti-
mal control. Player i now seeks to find the policy u(t)
that minimizes the functional
Eu,X
{
Φ(XT ) +
∫ T
0
(u(t)2 + λv(t)2) dt
}
, (18)
6FIG. 2. Example value functions corresponding to the system Eqs. 11 and 12. Panels A and B display VR(x, t) and VB(x, t)
respectively for λR = λB = 0, ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x) − Θ(−x)], and ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x| > 0.1) − Θ(|x| ≤ 0.1)] with ∆ = 0.1, while
panels C and D display VR(x, t) and VB(x, t) respectively for λR = λB = 2, ΦR(x) = 2 tanh(x), and ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). For
each solution we enforce Neumann no-flux boundary conditions and set σ = 0.6. The solution is computed on a grid with
x ∈ [−3, 3], setting dx = 0.025, and integrating for Nt = 8000 timesteps.
subject to the modified state equation
dx = [u(t) + v(t)]dt+ σdW. (19)
Following the logic of Eqs. 7 and 9, player i’s value func-
tion is now given by the solution to the considerably-
simpler HJB equation
−∂V
∂t
= −1
4
(
∂V
∂x
)2
+ v(t)
∂V
∂x
+ λv(t)2 +
σ2
2
∂2V
∂x2
,
V (x, T ) = Φ(x).
(20)
Though nonlinear, this HJB equation can be transformed
into a backward Kolmogorov equation through a change
of variables and subsequently be solved using path inte-
gral methods [21]. Setting V (x, t) = −η logϕ(x, t), sub-
stituting in Eq. 20, and performing the differentiation,
we are able to remove the nonlinearity if and only if
η2
4
1
ϕ2
(
∂ϕ
∂x
)2
= σ
2η
2
1
ϕ2
(
∂ϕ
∂x
)2
, so we set η = 2σ2. Per-
forming the change of variables, Eq. 20 is now linear and
has a time-dependent drift and sink term,
∂ϕ
∂t
=
λ
2σ2
v(t)2ϕ(x, t)− v(t)∂ϕ
∂x
− σ
2
2
∂2ϕ
∂x
,
ϕ(x, T ) = exp
{
− 1
2σ2
Φ(x)
} (21)
Application of the Feynman-Kac formula gives the solu-
tion to Eq. 21 as [22]
ϕ(x, t) = exp
{
− λ
2σ2
∫ T
t
v(t′)2 dt′
}
×
EYt
{
exp
[
− 1
2σ2
Φ(YT )
] ∣∣∣∣Yt = x} ,
(22)
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FIG. 3. We display realizations of uR and uB in the top panel
and paths of the electoral process in the bottom panel. We
draw these realizations from the game simulated with param-
eters λR = λB = 2, ΦR(x) = x, and ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x).
For this parameter set, Blue is fighting a losing battle—the
bottom panel clearly shows that, even with Blue attempting
to stop Red from interfering in the game, optimal play by
both players results in a significantly lower E[Zt] than for the
electoral process without any interference.
where Yt is defined by
dYt = v(t) dt+ σdWt, Y0 = x. (23)
Using this formalism, path integral control can be applied
to estimate the value function for arbitrary v(t). Fig. 7
displays path integral solutions to Eq. 20 when player ¬i
credibly commits to playing v(t) = t2 for the duration
of the game and player i’s final cost function takes the
form Φ(x) = Θ(|x| > 1) − Θ(|x| ≤ 1). In the further
restricted case where there is a credible commitment by
one party to play v(t) = v, a constant control policy, we
can say more about the nature of solutions. We will also
show presently why this constraint is actually not all that
restrictive. Under this assumption, the probability law
corresponding with Eq. 23 is given by
u(y, t) =
1√
2piσ2t
exp
{
1
2σ2t
[(y − x)− vt]2
}
, (24)
so that the (exponentially-transformed) value function
reads
ϕ(x, t) =
exp
{
−λv22σ2 (T − t)
}
√
2piσ2(T − t) ×
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
[
Φ(y) +
((y − x)− v(T − t))2
T − t
]}
dy.
(25)
This integral can be evaluated exactly for many Φ(y) and,
for many Φ, can be approximated using the method of
Laplace. When t → T so that the denominator of the
argument of the exponential in Eq. 25 approaches zero,
Laplace’s approximation to the integral reads
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
[
Φ(y) +
((y − x)− v(T − t))2
T − t
]}
dy
'
√
2piσ2(T − t) exp
{
− 1
2σ2
Φ(x+ (T − t)v)
}
,
(26)
so that, inverting the transformation above, the value
function can be approximated by
V (x, t) = λv2(T − t) + Φ(x+ (T − t)v), (27)
and the control policy by
u(t) = −1
2
Φ′(x+ (T − t)v). (28)
Fig. 8 displays the results of approximating the val-
ue function with Eq. 27 at t = 0, along with the true
(numerically-determined) value function at both t = 0
and, for reference, t = T .
It is interesting to analyze the dependence of the Laplace-
approximated value function on a free parameter. If the
simplicity of the Laplace approximation is to have practi-
cal utility, the approximated control policy should ideally
have similar scaling and asymptotic properties as the true
control policy; solving an optimization problem for opti-
mal values of the free parameter, which we will denote by
a, may be one approach to satisfying this desideratum.
To this end, as a case study we consider the behavior of
the approximate value function V (a)(x, t) and its corre-
sponding control policy u(a)(x, t) when the final condition
is Φ(a)(x) = tanh(ax) as a→∞. We consider this specif-
ic example because Φ(a)(x)→ Θ(x)−Θ(−x), where Θ(·)
is the Heaviside function; this limit can be the source
of complicated behavior in a variety of fields such as
piecewise-smooth dynamical systems (both deterministic
and stochastic) [23, 24], Coulombic friction [25], and evo-
lutionary biology [26]. Fig. 9 displays the exponentially-
transformed value function Eq. 25 with final condition
Φi(x) = tanh(ax) for player i when player ¬i commits to
playing a constant strategy of v for the entire time period.
(The value function is computed numerically; we do not
use the Laplace approximation here.) As t → T , larger
8FIG. 4. Example sweeps over the coupling parameters λR and λB when Blue’s final condition is set to ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). We
vary the coupling parameters over [0, 3] and display the resulting standard deviation of the control policies uR(x) and uB(x).
Panels A and B represent one coupled system of equations, while panels C and D represent a coupled system of equations with
a different set of final conditions. In panel A, Red’s value function is set to ΦR(x) = tanh(x), while in panel B it is given by
ΦR(x) = Θ(x) − Θ(−x), where Θ(·) is the Heaviside function. We display a glyph of the corresponding final condition in the
upper right corner of each panel. Changing Red’s continuous final condition tanh(x) to the discontinuous Θ(x)−Θ(−x) results
in substantially increased variation in the control policies of both players.
values of the steepness parameter a lead to an increasing-
ly hard boundary betweeen areas of the state space that
are costly for player i (positive values of x) and those
that are less costly (negative values of x). Though this
behavior is qualitatively similar to behavior arising from
the final condition Φi(x) = Θ(x)−Θ(−x), we will show
presently, using the Laplace approximation, that there
are significant scaling differences in the control policies
resulting from these strategies. From the Laplace approx-
imation result (Eqs. 26 and 27), the value function is
approximately
V (a)(x, t) ≈ λv2(T − t) + tanh {a[x+ v(T − t)]} , (29)
and hence the control policy is approximately given by
u(a)(x, t) ≈ −a
2
sech2 {a[x+ v(T − t)]} , (30)
with both expansions valid when 1σ2(T−t) is large. When
Φ(x) = Θ(x) − Θ(−x), the value function can be com-
puted analytically; we have
9FIG. 5. Example sweeps over the coupling parameters λR and λB when Blue’s final condition is set to ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x).
We vary the coupling parameters over [0, 3] and display the resulting means of the control policies uR(x) and uB(x). Panels
A and B represent one coupled system of equations, while panels C and D represent a coupled system of equations with a
different set of final conditions. In contrast with Fig. 4 we alter Blue’s final condition from ΦB(x) = − 12x2Θ(−x) in panel C
to ΦB(x) = Θ(|x| > 0.1)−Θ(|x| ≤ 0.1) in panel D, while Red’s final condition is held constant at ΦR(x) = tanh(x). Altering
Blue’s final condition from continuous to discontinuous causes a greater than 100% increase in the maximum value of the mean
of Red’s control policy.
1√
2σ2(T − t)
∞∫
−∞
exp
{
− 1
2σ2
[
Θ(y)−Θ(−y) + ((y − x)− v(T − t))
2
T − t
]}
dy
= cosh
(
1
2σ2
)
+ sinh
(
1
2σ2
)
erf
(
− x+ v(T − t)√
2σ2(T − t)
)
,
(31)
whereupon we find that
V (x, t) = λv2(T − t)− 2σ2 log
[
cosh
(
1
2σ2
)
+ sinh
(
1
2σ2
)
erf
(
− x+ v(T − t)√
2σ2(T − t)
)]
(32)
and
u(x, t) = −
√
2σ2
pi(T − t)
exp
(
−(x+v(T−t))2
2σ2(T−t)
)
coth
(
1
2σ2
)
+ erf
(
− x+v(T−t)√
2σ2(T−t)
) .
(33)
The approximate control policy u(a)(x, t) and the limit-
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FIG. 6. In the case of strong coupling (λR and λB  0), discontinuous final solutions by either player cause superexponential
growth in the magnitude of each player’s control policy. Here we set λR = λB = 3 and integrate three systems, varying
only one final condition in each. Panel A displays a system with two continuous final conditions: ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and
ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Panel B displays the mean Red and Blue control policies when the Red final condition is changed to
ΦR(x) = Θ(x)−Θ(−x) as the Blue final condition remains equal to 12x2Θ(−x), while panel C shows the control policies when
ΦB(x) = Θ(|x| > 1.) − Θ(|x| < 1) and ΦR(x) = tanh(x). The shaded regions correspond to the middle 80 percentiles (10th
to 90th percentiles) of uR(t) and uB(t) for each t. When either player has a discontinuous final condition, the inter-percentile
range is substantially wider for both players than when both players have continuous final conditions.
ing control policy have similar purely negative bell-like
shapes but also differ substantially as t → T : The true
control policy decays as a Gaussian (though a Gaussian
modulated by the asymmetric function erf(·)), while the
approximate policy displays logistic decay and hence is
larger in magnitude farther from its global minimum than
is the true policy; while the approximate policy is sym-
metric, u(x, t) is asymmetric due to the error function
term. The differences between u(a)(x, t) and u(x, t) can
be minimized by considering the free parameter a as a
function of t and solving the functional minimization
problem
min
a(t)
T∫
t
∞∫
−∞
[u(a(t))(x, t)− u(x, t)]2 dx dt. (34)
The variational principle implies a stationary point of
this problem is given by the solution to
∞∫
−∞
[u(a(t))(x, t)− u(x, t)]∂u
(a(t))(x, t)
∂a(t)
dx = 0. (35)
We are unable to compute this integral analytically upon
substituting Eqs. 30 and 33; we instead find the solution
to the problem of Eq. 34 by numerically solving Eq. 35
using the secant method for each of 100 linearly-spaced
t ∈ [ 12 , 997510000]. We display the optimal a(t), along with
the corresponding u(a(t))(x, t) and true u(x, t) in Fig. 10.
We find that the optimal a(t) grows superexponential-
ly as t → T and that the accuracy of the approxima-
tion increases in this limit, which is expected given that
u(a)(x, t) is derived using the Laplace approximation and
it is in this limit that the Laplace approximation is valid.
Even with the seemingly-restrictive assumption of cred-
ible committment to a constant control policy v, this
theory can be used to provide a method for value func-
tion approximation in a noncooperative scenario. For
arbitrary v(t), expansion about t+ ∆t gives v(t+ ∆t) =
v(t) + v′(t)∆t, leading to an approximate value function
iteration over a small time increment ∆t,
V (x, t+∆t) ≈ λv(t)2(T−t)+Φ(x+(T−t)[v(t)+v′(t)∆t]).
(36)
In application, both of v(t) and v′(t) can be estimated
from possibly-noisy data on t′ ∈ [0, t] and used in this
approximation.
III. APPLICATION
A recent notable example of election interference oper-
ations is that of the Russian military foreign intelligence
service (GRU)’s and Internet Research Agency (IRA)’s
operations in the 2016 U.S. presidential election con-
test to attempt to harm one candidate’s chances of win-
ning (Hilary Clinton) and aid another candidate (Donald
Trump) [11]. Though Russian foreign intelligence had
conducted election interference operations in the past
at least once before, in the Ukrainian elections of 2014
[27], the 2015–16 operations were notable in that IRA
operatives used the microblogging website Twitter in an
attempt to influence the election outcome. When this
attack vector was discovered, Twitter accounts associat-
ed with IRA activity were shut down and all data asso-
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FIG. 7. Result of the path integral Monte Carlo solution
method applied to Eq. 20 with the final condition Φ(x) =
Θ(|x| > 1) − Θ(|x| ≤ 1) and v(t) = t2. Approximate value
functions are computed using N = 10000 trajectories sam-
pled from Eq. 23 for each point (x, t). Approximate value
functions are displayed in Panel A for t ∈ {0, 0.75, 1 − dt}
and the corresponding approximate control policies in Panel
B, along with their smoothed counterparts (15-step moving
averages, plotted in dashed curves). Panel C displays realiza-
tions of Yt, the process generating the measure under which
the solution is calculated. This method can be advantageous
over numerical solution of the nonlinear PDE when the final
condition is discontinous, as here, since in this case Eq. 20
has a solution for all t ∈ [0, T ] only in the sense of distri-
butions. The analytical control policy at t = T is given by
u(t) = − 1
2
[δ(x− 1)− δ(x+ 1)].
ciated with those accounts was collected and analyzed
[28–30]. There has been extensive analysis of the qual-
itative and statistical effects of these and other election
attack vectors (e.g., Facebook advertisement purchases)
on election polling and the outcome of the election [31],
while there has also been some work on the detection
of election influence campaigns more generally [32, 33].
However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there
exists no publicly-available effort to reverse-engineer the
exact qualitative nature of the control policies used by
the the IRA—Red team—and by U.S. domestic and for-
eign intelligence agencies—Blue team.
In an effort to perform data-driven simulation of Red-
Blue dynamics, we fit a form of the model described in
Sec. II A and compare it to qualitative theoretical predic-
tions, finding the free parameters in the model that best
describe the observed data and inferred latent controls.
It is relatively nontrivial to fit the parameters of the the-
oretical model because we are faced with two distinct
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FIG. 8. When player ¬i commits to playing a constant strat-
egy profile v(t) = v for a fixed interval of time, an analytic
approximate form for player i’s value function V (x, t) is given
by V (x, t) ' λv2(T − t) + Φ(x+ (T − t)v). The numerically-
determined value functions at time t = 0 are shown above in
black curves, while the Laplace approximations at t = 0 are
displayed in dashed curves. The curves of lighter hue are the
value functions at the final time T . The top panel demon-
strates results for the final condition Φ(x) = 1
2
x2, while the
bottom panel has Φ(x) = tanh(x).
sources of uncertainty: first, we cannot observe either
Red’s or Blue’s control policy directly because foreign
and domestic intelligence agencies shroud their activi-
ties in secrecy; and second, the payoff structure to each
player at the final time, which is necessary for a unique
solution to Eqs. 11 and 12, is also secret and unknown
to us. To partially circumvent these issues, we construct
a two-stage model. The first stage is a Bayesian struc-
tural time series model, depicted graphically in Fig. 11,
through which we are able to infer distributions of dis-
cretized analogues of uR(t), uB(t), and x(t). Once these
distributions are in hand, we minimize a loss function
that compares the means of these distributions to the
means of distributions produced by the model described
in Sec. II A.
Since the U.S. presidential election system is of nontriv-
ial complexity, owing both to the number of minor party
candidates that also compete and also to the unique Elec-
toral College system, we make the simplifying assump-
tions stated in Sec. I—namely, that only two candidates
contest the election and that the election process is mod-
eled by a simple “candidate A versus candidate B” poll.
Though there are undoubtedly better methods for fore-
casting elections, such as compartmental infection mod-
els [34], prediction markets [35], and more sophisticated
Bayesian models [36, 37], we purposefully construct our
statistical model to closely mimic the underlying elec-
tion model of Sec. II A to test the ability of this under-
lying model, coupled with our model of noncooperative
interaction, to reproduce inferred control and observed
election dynamics through posterior and posterior pre-
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FIG. 9. If player ¬i credibly commits to a strategy of playing a constant strategy with value equal to v for the entire duration
of the game, player i’s (exponentially-transformed) value function ϕ(x, t) has an integral representation given by Eq. 25. We
display dynamics of ϕ(x, t) in the case where Φ(x) = tanh(ax) for x ∈ (− 3
2
, 3
2
)
and logarithmically equally-spaced values of
a ∈ [10−3, 105]. For a < 10−1, the value function is nearly constant as a values this small render the final condition nearly
constant over this range of the state space. When a > 101, ∂
∂x
ϕ(x, t) rapidly increases in magnitude near x = 0 as t→ T .
dictive distributions. We can observe neither the Red
uR(t) nor Blue uB(t) control policies, but are able to
observe a proxy for uR, namely, the number of tweets
sent by IRA-associated accounts in the year leading up
to the 2016 election [38]. This dataset contains a total
of 2,973,371 tweets from 2,848 unique Twitter handles.
Of these tweets, a total of 1,107,361 occurred in the
year immediately preceding the election (08/11/2015 -
08/11/2016). We grouped these tweets by day and used
the time series of total number of tweets on each day as an
observable from which uR could be inferred. We restrict-
ed the time range of the model to begin at the later of
the end dates of the Republican National Convention (21
July 2016) and Democratic National Convention (28 July
2016) since the later of these dates, 28 July 2016, is the
day on which the race is officially between two major
party candidates. Of the above tweets, 363,131 occurred
during the 102 days beginning on 28 July 2016 and end-
ing the day before Election Day. We note that the pres-
ence of minor party candidates doubtless played a role
in the result of the election, but even the most promi-
nent minor parties (Libertarian and Green) received only
single-digit support [39, 40]. We do not model these par-
ties and instead consider only the zero-sum electoral con-
test between the two major parties. We used the Real-
ClearPolitics poll aggregation as a proxy for the electoral
process itself [41], averaging polls that occurred at the
same timestamp and using the earliest date in the date
range of the poll if it was conducted over multiple days
as the timestamp of that observation.
Using these two observed random variables, we fit a
Bayesian structural time series model [42] of the form
presented in Fig. 11. We briefly describe the structure
of the model and explain our choices of priors and like-
lihood functions. In the analytical model, we model the
latent control policies uR(t) and uB(t) implicitly as time-
and state-dependent Wiener processes. This is seen by
recalling that the state equation evolves according to a
Wiener process and applying Ito’s lemma to the deter-
ministic functions of a random variable − 12 ∂VR∂x′
∣∣
x′=xt
and
− 12 ∂VB∂x′
∣∣
x′=xt
, which define the control policies. A dis-
cretized version of the Wiener process is a simple Gaus-
sian random walk; we thus model the latent Red and
Blue control policies by Gaussian random walks:
p(uR,t|uR,t−1, µR, σ) = N (uR,t−1 + µR, σ2) (37)
p(uB,t|uB,t−1, µB , σ) = N (uB,t−1 + µB , σ2) (38)
Similarly, the latent election process is modeled by a dis-
cretized version of the state evolution equation, Eq. 3:
p(Xt|Xt−1, uR, uB)
= N (Xt−1 + uB,t−1 − uR,t−1, 1) (39)
We assume that the latent election model is subject
to normal observation error in latent space. Since we
chose a logistic function as the link between the latent
and real (on (0, 1)) election spaces, the likelihood for the
observed election process is thus given by a Logit-Normal
distribution. The pdf of this distribution is
p(Zt|Xt, σZ) =
√
1
2piσ2Z
exp
{
− (logit(Zt)−Xt)2
2σ2Z
}
Zt(1− Zt) . (40)
Though the number of IRA tweets that occur on any giv-
en day is obviously a non-negative integer, we chose not
to model it this way. The usual model for a “count” ran-
dom variable, such as the tweet time series, is a Poisson
distribution with time-dependent rate parameter. How-
ever, this model imposes a strong assumption on the vari-
ance of the count distribution (namely, that the variance
and mean are equal) which does not seem realistic in
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FIG. 10. The solution to the problem formulated in Eq. 34 is
a superexponentially-increasing a(t) parameter in the Laplace
method-derived value function V (a)(x, t) = tanh(ax). We use
this value function as an approximation to the exact value
function given in Eq. 32. Dashed curves indicate u(x, t), while
solid curves indicate u(a)(x, t). The lower-right inset axis dis-
plays the same data as the main axis and also includes u(x, t)
and u(a)(x, t) at the last simulation timestep, t = 0.9975, to
demonstrate the increasing accuracy of the approximation as
t→ T . The lower-left inset displays the optimal a(t).
the context of the tweet data. Instead of searching for
a discrete count distribution that meets some optimality
criterion, we instead chose to first normalize the tweet
time series to have zero mean and unit variance (thus
making it a continuous random variable rather than a
discrete one) and then to shift the time series so that the
the new time series was equal to zero on the day during
our study with the fewest tweets. We then modeled this
time series Tweetst by a normal observation likelihood,
p(Tweetst|uR,t, σTweets) = N (uR,t, σ2Tweets). (41)
We placed a weakly-informative prior, a Log-Normal dis-
tribution, on each standard deviation random variable
(σ, σZ , σTweets), and zero-centered Normal priors on each
mean random variable (µR, µB). This model is high-
dimensional, since the observed time series Tweets and
Z and latent time series X, uR, and uB are inferred as
T -dimensional vectors possessing the covariance struc-
ture imposed by the (biased) random walk assumption;
in total this model has 5T + 5 = 515 degrees of freedom.
We fit this statistical model, a graphical representation of
which is displayed in Fig. 11, using the No-U-Turn Sam-
pler algorithm [43], sampling 2000 draws from the mod-
FIG. 11. We approximate the time series components of the
analytical model defined in Sec. II A by a Bayesian structural
time series model that we subsequently confront with data
pertaining to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Observed
random variables are denoted by gray-shaded nodes, while
latent random variables are represented by unshaded nodes
or red (uR,t) and blue (uB,t) nodes. We observe a noisy elec-
tion poll, denoted by Zt, and a time series of tweets associ-
ated with the Russian Internet Research Agency, denoted by
Tweets. Our objective in this modeling stage is to infer the
latent electoral process, denoted by Xt, and the latent control
policies.
el’s distribution from each of two independent Markov
chains, not including 1000 draws per chain of burn-in.
The sampler appeared to converge well based on graph-
ical consideration (i.e., the “eye test”) of draws from
the posterior predictive distribution of Zt and Tweetst,
and—more importantly—because maximum values of
Gelman-Rubin statistics [44] for all variables satisfied
Rmax < 1.01 except for that of σZ (Rmax = 1.07646).
Each of these values is well below the level R = 1.1
advocated by Brooks and Gelman [45]. Fig. 12 displays
draws from the posterior and posterior predictive dis-
tribution of this model. Panel A displays draws of Xt
from the posterior distribution, along with E[Xt] and
logit(Zt), while in panel B we show posterior draws of
uR and uB, along with E[uR] and E[uB] in thick red and
blue curves respectively. In panel C, we display Tweetst
and draws from its posterior predictive distribution. On
10/06/2016, Tweetst exhibits a large spike that is very
unlikely under the posterior predictive distribution. This
spike likely corresponds with a statement made by the
U.S. federal government on this date that officially rec-
ognized the Russian government as culpable for hacking
the Democratic National Committee computers.
After inferring the latent control policies and electoral
14
FIG. 12. Panel A displays the logit of the observed elec-
tion time series (black curve) logit(Zt), along with the pos-
terior distribution of the latent electoral process Xt. Panel
B displays the mean latent control policies in thick red and
blue curves, along with their posterior distributions. Panel C
shows the true tweet time series (subject to the normalization
described in the main body) along with draws from its poste-
rior predictive distribution. The large spike in the tweet time
series that is not predicted by the posterior predictive dis-
tribution corresponds to the day (10/06/2016) on which the
U.S. federal government officially accused Russia of hacking
the Democratic National Committee computers.
process, we searched for the parameter values θ =
(λR, λB, σ,ΦR,ΦB) of the theoretical model described in
Sec. II B that best explain the observed data and latent
variables inferred by the time series model described
in this section. For clarity in reference, we will here-
after refer to this theoretical model as Mˆ and the
Bayesian structural time series model derived earlier
in this section as M. We use Legendre polynomi-
als to approximate the final conditions of Eqs. 11 and
12, ΦR and ΦB, setting Φi(x) '
∑K
k=0 aikPk(x), so
that the actual parameter vector considered is θ =
(λR, λB, σ, a0,r, ..., aK,r, a0,b, ..., aK,b). In contrast with
M, Mˆ has relatively few degrees of freedom since the
assumption of state and policy co-evolution via solution
of coupled partial differential equations (Eqs. 11 and 12)
substantially restricts the system’s dynamics. In total,
Mˆ has 2K + 3 free parameters; we set K = 10 for a
total of 23 degrees of freedom. The theoretical model
Mˆ can be viewed as a generative probabilitistic func-
tion so that, to find values of parameters that ensure
Mˆ best describes observed and inferred reality, we draw
(uˆR, uˆB, Xˆ) ∼ pˆ(uˆR, uˆB, Xˆ|θ,Mˆ) and minimize a loss
function of these generated values and the values inferred
by M. We defined a loss function of the form
L(θ|Mˆ) =
∑
(y,yˆ)
[
‖µy − µyˆ‖22 + ησyˆ
]
, (42)
where y ∈ {uR, uB, X} and yˆ ∈ {uˆR, uˆB, Xˆ}. We have
defined the mean and standard deviation under the cor-
responding distribution by µ and σ respectively. The
`2 loss terms penalize deviation by Mˆ from the mean
of M’s inferred posterior distribution, while the stan-
dard deviation term imposes a penalty on dispersion. We
minimized the loss function of Eq. 42 using a Gaussian-
process Bayesian optimization algorithm, the details of
which are beyond the scope of this work but are readily
found in any review paper on the subject [46–48]. Fig.
13 displays the result of this optimization procedure for
K = 10 and η = 0.002. For this set of hyperparameters,
we found coupling parameter values of λR = 0.1432 and
λB = 1.7847 and a latent space volatility of σ = 0.7510.
Panel A of Fig. 13 displays logit(Zt) in a thick black
curve and draws of Xˆ from Mˆ in grey curves; logit(Zt)
is centered in the distribution of Xˆ and hence has a high
probability under Mˆ. In panel B, we show E[uR] and
E[uB] in thick red and blue curves respectively along
with empirical distributions of uˆR and uˆR. These empir-
ical distributions exhibit heteroskedasticity; their vari-
ance increases as t → 102 days—the last day before the
election. In Fig. 14 we expand on panel B, displaying
a forest plot with the time-to-go T − t on the vertical
axis and the middle 80 (10th to 90th) percentiles of the
empirical distributions of uˆR and uˆB under Mˆ on the
horizontal axis. lie in the credible intervals for the first
approximate fortnight after the end of the Democratic
National Convention. One possible explanation for this
phenomena is that, although the election does officially
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FIG. 13. Parameter values found though application of a Bayesian optimization algorithm to the problem of finding optimal
parameters of Mˆ using the objective function given by Eq. 42 generate the above distributions of latent election process X
and Red and Blue control policies, uR and uB. We ran the optimization algorithm with the number of terms of the Legendre
expansion of ΦR and ΦB set to K = 10 and set the variance regularization to η = 0.002, which resulted in fit parameters
of λR = 0.849, λB = 0.727, and σ = 1.509. Panel A displays draws from the latent electoral process under Mˆ, along with
logit(Zt), the logit-transformed real polling popularity process. Panel B displays draws from the distributions of uˆR and uˆB
under Mˆ, while panel C displays the inferred final conditions ΦR(x) and ΦB(x).
become a two-candidate contest at that time (notwith-
standing our previous comments about third-party candi-
dates), the effects of the Republican and Democratic pri-
maries may take time to dissipate; unmodeled dynamics
of noncooperative games in the presence of many candi-
dates may still be dominant during this time. Finally, we
display the inferred final conditions ΦR(x) and ΦB(x) in
panel C of Fig. 13.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We introduce, analyze, and numerically solve (analyt-
ically solve in simplified cases) a simple, first-principles
model of noncooperative strategic interference by a for-
eign intelligence service from one country (Red) in
an election occurring in another country (Blue) and
attempts by Blue’s domestic intelligence service to
counter this interference. Though simple, our model is
able to provide qualitative insight into the dynamics of
such strategic interactions and performs well when fitted
to polling and social media data surrounding the 2016
U.S. presidential election contest. We find that all-or-
nothing attitudes regarding the outcome of the election
interference (whether or not it was successful) with no
gradation of utility, even if these attitudes are held by
only one player, result in an arms race of spending on
interference and counter-interference operations by both
players. We then find analytical solutions to player i’s
optimal control problem in the case where player ¬i cred-
ibly commits to a strategy v(t) and detail an analyti-
cal value function approximation that can be used by
player i even when player ¬i does not commit to a par-
ticular strategy as long as player ¬i’s current strategy
and its derivative can be estimated. We demonstrate
the applicability of our model to real election interfer-
ence scenarios by analyzing the Russian effort to inter-
fere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election through obser-
vation of Russian Internet Research Agency (IRA) troll
account posts on the website Twitter. Using this data,
along with aggregate presidential election polling data,
we infer the time series of Russian and U.S. control poli-
cies and find parameters of our model that best explain
these inferred (latent) control policies. We show that, for
most of the time under consideration, our model provides
a good explanation for the inferred variables.
There are several areas in which our work could be
improved. From a theoretical point of view, our mod-
el is one of the simplest that can be proposed to model
this situation. While from an a priori point of view it is
derived using a minimum of assumption about the elec-
tion mechanics, electorate, and cost (equivalently, utility)
functions of the respective intelligence agencies and hence
is justafiable on the grounds of parsimony and acceptable
empirical performance (on at least one election contest),
the kind of assumptions that we make are rather unrealis-
tic. Though a pure random walk model for am election is
not without serious precedent [49], a prudent extension
of this work could incorporate non-interference-related
state dynamics as a generalization of Eq. 3, e.g., as
dx = [µ0 + µ1x+ uR(t) + uB(t)]dt+ σdW. (43)
This state equation can account for simple drift in the
election results as a candidate endogenously becomes
more or less popular or capture possible mean-reverting
behavior in a hotly-contested race. Another interest-
ing extension would introduce state-dependent running
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FIG. 14. The mean latent Red and Blue control policies
inferred in the context of M fall within the middle 80 per-
centiles of Mˆ for almost the entire time period of study. The
thick red and blue curves represent E[uR] and E[uB] respec-
tively, while the upper and lower boundaries of the filled
regions are the 10th and 90th percentiles of the respective
probability distributions under Mˆ. During the first rough-
ly 10 days after the Democratic National Convention (which
occurred on 7/28/2016, or T − t = 103 on this plot), E[uR]
or E[uB] fall outside of this credible interval.
costs, particularly in the running cost of the Red player.
Though the action of election interference is nominally
intended to cause a particular candidate to win or lose,
there are often other goals as well, such as undermining
the Blue citizens’ trust in their electoral process. Thus,
Red might gain utility even just from having a partic-
ular candidate pull ahead in polls multiple times when
that candidate would not have otherwise done so, even if
the candidate does not actually win the election. In the
context of our model, this can be represented by setting
Red’s cost functional to be
EuR,uB,X
{
ΦR(XT ) +
∫ T
0
[−Θ(−Xt)
+ u2R(t)− λRu2B(t)] dt
}
.
(44)
Both of these modifications are relatively easy to incor-
porate into the model and will not change the quali-
tative nature of Red and Blue’s HJB equations since
their effects will simply be to introduce an additional
drift term (Eq. 43) or a continuous, non-differentiable
source term (Eq. 44) into the HJB equations (Eqs. 11
and 12); the fundamental nature of these equations as
nonlinear parabolic equations coupled through quadrat-
ic terms of self and other-player first spatial derivatives
remains unchanged as these modifications to the theo-
ry do not introduce any new coupling terms. With the
modification of Eq. 43, the HJB equations become
− ∂VR
∂t
= (µ0 + µ1x)
∂VR
∂x
− 1
4
(
∂VR
∂x
)2
− 1
2
∂VR
∂x
∂VB
∂x
− λR
4
(
∂VB
∂x
)2
+
σ2
2
∂2VR
∂x2
,
VR(x, T ) = ΦR(x)
(45)
and
− ∂VB
∂t
= (µ0 + µ1x)
∂VB
∂x
− 1
4
(
∂VB
∂x
)2
− 1
2
∂VB
∂x
∂VR
∂x
− λB
4
(
∂VR
∂x
)2
+
σ2
2
∂2VB
∂x2
,
VB(x, T ) = ΦB(x),
(46)
while with the modification of Eq. 44 Red’s HJB equation
reads
− ∂VR
∂t
= −1
4
(
∂VR
∂x
)2
− 1
2
∂VR
∂x
∂VB
∂x
− λR
4
(
∂VB
∂x
)2
−Θ(−x) + σ
2
2
∂2VR
∂x2
,
VR(x, T ) = ΦR(x).
(47)
A more fundamental qualitative change would be to
expand the scope of Red’s interference to alter the latent
volatility of the election process. For example, the objec-
tive of Red’s interference operations might be not only
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to change the drift of the state equation to make it more
likely for candidate A to win, but also to increase the
uncertainty associated with the election’s polling.
In addition to theoretical modifications, other work could
simply extend the present results to other elections using
similarly fine-grained data or, ideally, even more granu-
lar data. The principal difficulty with this approach lies
in the inherent difficulty of finding any data at all with
which to work. Though there do exist public datasets
of election interference episodes [6], the characteristic
timescale of this data is much longer than that used
in our analysis. As we note in Sec. III, we are able to
confront our model to data only because the Russian
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election was so
well-publicized and because the interference took place
at least partially through the mechanism of Twitter, a
public data source. Even so, we found it necessary to
infer the variables in which we were actually interest-
ed. Other than this event, we were unable to find any
publicly-available data of sufficient temporal resolution
for any other publicly-acknowledged election interference
episode.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are grateful for financial support from the
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company.
[1] Paul SA Renaud and Frans AAM van Winden. On the
importance of elections and ideology for government pol-
icy in a multi-party system. In The Logic of Multiparty
Systems, pages 191–207. Springer, 1987.
[2] Jorgen Elklit and Palle Svensson. What makes elections
free and fair? Journal of Democracy, 8(3):32–46, 1997.
[3] Dov H Levin. When the great power gets a vote: The
effects of great power electoral interventions on election
results. International Studies Quarterly, 60(2):189–202,
2016.
[4] Stephen Shulman and Stephen Bloom. The legitimacy of
foreign intervention in elections: The ukrainian response.
Review of International Studies, 38(2):445–471, 2012.
[5] Daniel Corstange and Nikolay Marinov. Taking sides
in other peoples elections: The polarizing effect of for-
eign intervention. American Journal of Political Science,
56(3):655–670, 2012.
[6] Dov H Levin. Partisan electoral interventions by the
great powers: Introducing the PEIG Dataset. Conflict
Management and Peace Science, 36(1):88–106, 2019.
[7] Erica D Borghard and Shawn W Lonergan. Confidence
Building Measures for the Cyber Domain. Strategic Stud-
ies Quarterly, 12(3):10–49, 2018.
[8] Dov H Levin. Voting for Trouble? Partisan Electoral
Interventions and Domestic Terrorism. Terrorism and
Political Violence, pages 1–17, 2018.
[9] Isabella Hansen and Darren J Lim. Doxing democracy:
influencing elections via cyber voter interference. Con-
temporary Politics, 25(2):150–171, 2019.
[10] Johannes Bubeck, Kai Ja¨ger, Nikolay Marinov, and Fed-
erico Nanni. Why Do States Intervene in the Elections
of Others? Available at SSRN 3435138, 2019.
[11] Read the Mueller Report: Searchable Document and
Index: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive
/2019/04/18/us/politics/mueller-report-document.html.
New York Times, Apr 2019.
[12] Crispin W Gardiner. Handbook of Stochastic Methods,
volume 3. Springer Berlin, 1985.
[13] Peter Jung and Peter Ha¨nggi. Dynamical systems: a
unified colored-noise approximation. Physical Review A,
35(10):4464, 1987.
[14] Peter Ha¨nggi and Peter Jung. Colored noise in dynami-
cal systems. Advances in Chemical Physics, 89:239–326,
1995.
[15] Richard Bellman. Dynamic programming and a new for-
malism in the calculus of variations. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of
America, 40(4):231, 1954.
[16] Richard Bellman. Dynamic programming. Science,
153(3731):34–37, 1966.
[17] Rainer Buckdahn and Juan Li. Stochastic differen-
tial games and viscosity solutions of Hamilton–Jacobi–
Bellman–Isaacs equations. SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 47(1):444–475, 2008.
[18] Triet Pham and Jianfeng Zhang. Two person zero-sum
game in weak formulation and path dependent Bellman–
Isaacs equation. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimiza-
tion, 52(4):2090–2121, 2014.
[19] Code to recreate simulations and plots in this paper—
or to create new simulations and “what-if” scenarios—is
located at https://gitlab.com/daviddewhurst/red-blue-
game.
[20] Michael G Crandall, Hitoshi Ishii, and Pierre-Louis
Lions. Users guide to viscosity solutions of second order
partial differential equations. Bulletin of the American
Mathematical Society, 27(1):1–67, 1992.
[21] Hilbert J Kappen. Path integrals and symmetry breaking
for optimal control theory. Journal of Statistical Mechan-
ics: Theory and Experiment, 2005(11):P11011, 2005.
[22] Mark Kac. On distributions of certain Wiener function-
als. Transactions of the American Mathematical Society,
65(1):1–13, 1949.
[23] Yaming Chen, Adrian Baule, Hugo Touchette, and Wol-
fram Just. Weak-noise limit of a piecewise-smooth
stochastic differential equation. Physical Review E,
88(5):052103, 2013.
[24] Julie Leifeld, Kaitlin Hill, and Andrew Roberts. Per-
sistence of saddle behavior in the nonsmooth limit
of smooth dynamical systems. arXiv preprint arX-
iv:1504.04671, 2015.
[25] Kiyoshi Kanazawa, Tomohiko G Sano, Takahiro Sagawa,
and Hisao Hayakawa. Asymptotic derivation of Langevin-
like equation with non-gaussian noise and its analyti-
cal solution. Journal of Statistical Physics, 160(5):1294–
1335, 2015.
18
[26] Sofia H Piltz, Lauri Harhanen, Mason A Porter, and
Philip K Maini. Inferring parameters of prey switching in
a 1 predator–2 prey plankton system with a linear pref-
erence tradeoff. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 456:108–
122, 2018.
[27] Peter Tanchak. The Invisible Front: Russia, Trolls,
and the Information War against Ukraine. Revolution
and War in Contemporary Ukraine: The Challenge of
Change, 161:253, 2017.
[28] Brandon C Boatwright, Darren L Linvill, and Patrick L
Warren. Troll factories: The internet research agency
and state-sponsored agenda building. Resource Centre
on Media Freedom in Europe, 2018.
[29] Adam Badawy, Emilio Ferrara, and Kristina Lerman.
Analyzing the digital traces of political manipulation:
the 2016 Russian interference Twitter campaign. In 2018
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Advances in
Social Networks Analysis and Mining (ASONAM), pages
258–265. IEEE, 2018.
[30] Ryan L Boyd, Alexander Spangher, Adam Fourney,
Besmira Nushi, Gireeja Ranade, James Pennebaker, and
Eric Horvitz. Characterizing the Internet Research Agen-
cys Social Media Operations During the 2016 US Presi-
dential Election using Linguistic Analyses. 2018.
[31] Damian J Ruck, Natalie M Rice, Joshua Borycz, and
R Alexander Bentley. Internet Research Agency Twitter
activity predicted 2016 US election polls. First Monday,
24(7), 2019.
[32] Nicolas Guenon des Mesnards and Tauhid Zaman.
Detecting influence campaigns in social networks using
the Ising model. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.10244, 2018.
[33] Jane Im, Eshwar Chandrasekharan, Jackson Sargent,
Paige Lighthammer, Taylor Denby, Ankit Bhargava, Lib-
by Hemphill, David Jurgens, and Eric Gilbert. Still out
there: Modeling and Identifying Russian Troll Accounts
on Twitter. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.11162, 2019.
[34] Alexandria Volkening, Daniel F Linder, Mason A Porter,
and Grzegorz A Rempala. Forecasting elections using
compartmental models of infections. arXiv preprint arX-
iv:1811.01831, 2018.
[35] David Rothschild. Forecasting elections: Comparing pre-
diction markets, polls, and their biases. Public Opinion
Quarterly, 73(5):895–916, 2009.
[36] Drew A Linzer. Dynamic Bayesian forecasting of presi-
dential elections in the states. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 108(501):124–134, 2013.
[37] Wei Wang, David Rothschild, Sharad Goel, and Andrew
Gelman. Forecasting elections with non-representative
polls. International Journal of Forecasting, 31(3):980–
991, 2015.
[38] Data can be downloaded at https://github.com/
fivethirtyeight/russian-troll-tweets/.
[39] Ramin Skibba. Pollsters struggle to explain failures of us
presidential forecasts. Nature News, 539(7629):339, 2016.
[40] Ryan Neville-Shepard. Constrained by duality: Third-
party master narratives in the 2016 presidential election.
American Behavioral Scientist, 61(4):414–427, 2017.
[41] Data can be downloaded at https://www.
realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/
us/general_election_trump_vs_clinton_vs_johnson_
vs_stein-5952.html.
[42] David Barber, A Taylan Cemgil, and Silvia Chiappa.
Bayesian Time Series Models. Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
[43] Matthew D Hoffman and Andrew Gelman. The No-
U-Turn sampler: adaptively setting path lengths in
Hamiltonian Monte Carlo. Journal of Machine Learn-
ing Research, 15(1):1593–1623, 2014.
[44] Andrew Gelman, Donald B Rubin, et al. Inference from
iterative simulation using multiple sequences. Statistical
Science, 7(4):457–472, 1992.
[45] Stephen P Brooks and Andrew Gelman. General
methods for monitoring convergence of iterative simula-
tions. Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics,
7(4):434–455, 1998.
[46] Eric Brochu, Vlad M Cora, and Nando De Freitas. A
tutorial on Bayesian optimization of expensive cost func-
tions, with application to active user modeling and hier-
archical reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint arX-
iv:1012.2599, 2010.
[47] Bobak Shahriari, Kevin Swersky, Ziyu Wang, Ryan P
Adams, and Nando De Freitas. Taking the human out of
the loop: A review of Bayesian optimization. Proceedings
of the IEEE, 104(1):148–175, 2015.
[48] Peter I Frazier. A tutorial on bayesian optimization. arX-
iv preprint arXiv:1807.02811, 2018.
[49] Nassim Nicholas Taleb. Election predictions as martin-
gales: An arbitrage approach. Quantitative Finance,
18(1):1–5, 2018.
19
Appendix A: Coupling parameter sweeps
1. Expected value of ui(t)
FIG. 15. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condition
ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corresponds to mean
of control policy.
FIG. 16. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condition
ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x| − 0.1) − Θ(0.1 − |x|)]. Intensity of color
corresponds to mean of control policy.
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FIG. 17. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condi-
tion ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds to mean of
control policy.
FIG. 18. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corre-
sponds to mean of control policy.
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FIG. 19. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x|−0.1)−Θ(0.1−|x|)]. Intensity
of color corresponds to mean of control policy.
FIG. 20. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds
to mean of control policy.
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FIG. 21. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corresponds to
mean of control policy.
FIG. 22. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x|−0.1)−Θ(0.1−|x|)]. Intensity of color
corresponds to mean of control policy.
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FIG. 23. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds to mean
of control policy.
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2. Standard deviation of ui(t)
FIG. 24. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condition
ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corresponds to std of
control policy.
FIG. 25. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condition
ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x| − 0.1) − Θ(0.1 − |x|)]. Intensity of color
corresponds to std of control policy.
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FIG. 26. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = x and Blue final condition
ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds to std of control
policy.
FIG. 27. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corre-
sponds to std of control policy.
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FIG. 28. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x|−0.1)−Θ(0.1−|x|)]. Intensity
of color corresponds to std of control policy.
FIG. 29. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = 2[Θ(x)−Θ(−x)] and Blue
final condition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds
to std of control policy.
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FIG. 30. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2Θ(−x). Intensity of color corresponds to
std of control policy.
FIG. 31. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) = 2[Θ(|x|−0.1)−Θ(0.1−|x|)]. Intensity of color
corresponds to std of control policy.
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FIG. 32. Parameter sweep over coupling parameters λR, λB
with Red final condition ΦR(x) = tanh(x) and Blue final con-
dition ΦB(x) =
1
2
x2. Intensity of color corresponds to std of
control policy.
